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Abstract: This paper models transfers outside the household for both the Canadian-
born and foreign-born Canadian populations in a traditional expenditure framework 
with an unique composition of goods to illustrate the special motivations to remit by 
immigrants. We theorise that remittances to persons outside the households 
represent transfers to maintain social relations with relatives and friends and 
religious/charitable remittances are expenditures which foster group membership. 
Using Canadian survey data we estimate transfer functions as part of a larger 
expenditure system and calculate Engel elasticities for remittances to persons and to 
charities by both the Canadian and foreign-born populations. We conclude that 
expenditures to enhance social relations with relatives and friends (i.e. remittances to 
persons) are a normal good for recent Asian immigrants and a luxury good for all 
other immigrants and Canadians. Moreover, Asian households are the only ones that 
remit significantly more of their total expenditures to persons upon arrival, 
compared to the Canadian reference group, and their remittance behaviour does not 
converse to that of Canadian-born over time. This latter fact indicates strong cultural 
differences within the remitting households, most probably due to the fact that Asian 
households have stronger social ties to their extended family. Finally, with the 
exception of lower income North American and European immigrant households, all 
other immigrant groups and Canadians generally consider group membership 




The foreign-born Canadian resident population analysed in this paper is large (5 
million), diverse and growing (250,000 per year). In addition, the vast majority of 
these foreign-born residents are admitted to Canada on a permanent basis (96%) and 
are often accompanied by their immediate families.1 Finally, Canada’s family 
reunification policy permits sponsorship of parents and grandparents with no 
                                                 
1 Permanent Canadian immigrants upon admission are permitted to immediately bring with them their spouse and any minor 
(under age 19) children. In 2001, only 198,640 foreign-born residents were non-permanent out of a total of 5.7 million 
foreign-born residents (Statistics Canada, 2001).  
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explicit waiting period, thus, potentially blunting the motivation to remit.2 Under 
these conditions of a guaranteed permanent residence for the nuclear immigrant 
household and the prospect of relatively expeditious family reunification as well as 
quick accession to citizenship, we test the motivation to remit in the Canadian 
context.3 
The literature on the behaviour of households with regard to remittances 
outside the household is substantial and covers the general motivation to remit and 
outlines specific determinants. 
Cox (1987) argues that there exist two main motivations for private 
remittances: altruism and exchange. Becker (1974) earlier stated that a remittance 
represents a benevolent act which promotes well-being and equality across the 
extended family. In a less altruistic version of the exchange model proposed by 
Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers (1985), remittances are motivated by the prospect of 
a later exchange for services by extended family members. 
Lucas and Stark (1985) more broadly addressed the range of immigrants’ 
remittance motives and classified their intentions to remit as influenced by pure 
altruism, self-interest and tempered altruism or enlightened self-interest. The pure 
self-interest motivation includes an aspiration to inherit and a desire to invest in 
assets at home, especially when the immigrant intends to return to his/her home 
country. If remittances occur as a result of a beneficial contractual agreement 
between the migrant and home, they are termed by Lucas and Stark (1985) as acts of 
“tempered altruism or enlightened self-interest”. One example is when remittances 
are in fact a repayment to the migrant’s family for a previous educational investment 
in the immigrant. Migrants may also remit part of their income because of an implied 
co-insurance contract between them and the family. Under this system the 
motivation to remit is an attempt to secure the help of the family when the need 
arises (Stark 1991). 
                                                 
2 There is however a financial constraint on family reunification. Before an immigrant can sponsor a relative, the sponsor 
must demonstrate financial viability. This is accomplished if the immigrant household’s income from non-government 
transfers exceeds the poverty line (LICO) in the city of residence. This value circa 2005 is approximately CA$40,000 in 
urban Canada and beyond the reach of the vast majority of recent Canadian immigrants. 
3 Over 75% of Canada’s foreign-born population had ascended to citizenship in 1996 (DeVoretz and Pivnenko, 2006).  
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Limited empirical evidence tends to support some of the above hypotheses. 
Cox and Rank (1992) find that empirical patterns for inter-vivo remittances are more 
consistent with exchange than altruism.4 Cox (1987) reached a similar conclusion. 
Duraisamy et al. (2000) observe a strong positive association between family ties and 
remittances and argue that this represents indirect evidence in support of the 
altruism hypothesis. 
Other scholars report a link between remittances, intention to return home 
and investment in human and physical capital. Ahlburg et al. (1998) find very little 
evidence to support the assumption that immigrants plan to return home with 
significant embodied human capital. However, they note that those who plan to 
return remit significantly more and also accumulate far more physical capital at 
home than those who do not plan to return. Brown (1994) concludes that more funds 
are remitted when these funds are intended for savings and investment rather than 
when they are used for family consumption. 
Shamsuddin and DeVoretz (1998) analyse the more general question of wealth 
accumulation of immigrant and non-immigrant households in Canada. They observe 
a strong transfer (bequest) motive for the Canadian foreign born and a bias toward 
home ownership in the investment portfolios.5 They note that these two phenomena 
should act as a substitute for remittances by the foreign-born household. 
This paper builds on this literature by assessing the motivations of households 
to remit within an explicit expenditure framework. We distinguish between two 
kinds of transfers made by households: to persons and to religious/charitable 
organisations, and we argue that these are expenses on social relations with relatives 
and friends and on group membership respectively. In addition, we hypothesize that 
expenditures on housing foster social relations among the household members. 
These features are incorporated in the model developed below. 
Little systematic research, if any, has been done on ethnic group cultural 
differences in the remittance behaviour of households. However, as reflected by the 
Ethnic Diversity Survey, some Canadian ethnic groups were more likely to have 
                                                 
4 Inter vivo transfers are those between living persons (vs. bequests). 
5 Didukh (2002) also notes this possible home ownership-remittance substitution.  
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frequent contact with their relatives in their country of origin than others. For 
example, 62% of those with Filipino ancestry reported monthly or more frequent 
contact with their relatives compared to 46% of those with Chinese, 31% of those 
with Italian and 20% of those with German origin.6 And we believe that such 
differences are determined, at least partially, by cultural differences in social/family 
norms7, thus, affecting the remittance behaviour of households as well. 
In this study, we distinguish between four Canadian population groups: 
Canadian-born, immigrants from North America and Western Europe, immigrants 
from South and Eastern Europe, and immigrants from China, Asia and Oceania. In 
order to estimate the importance each group gives to the two kinds of transfers (i.e. 
to persons and to charities), Engel elasticities for each group and type of transfer are 
calculated, under more or less restrictive conditions. Further, we illustrate the 
households’ remittance experience with a series of simulations over the households’ 
life cycle. And finally, we test for immigration, cultural and assimilation effects with 
respect to the remittance behaviour of immigrant households in Canada. 
 
Model 
This section presents a utility maximisation model which describes the way 
households allocate their income between consumption of traditional goods and 
remittances. We theorise that household members derive utility from the 
consumption of traditional goods and services and three kinds of social relations: (a) 
social relations between family/household members, (b) social relations with 
relatives and friends living outside the household, and (c) membership in 
social/religious groups. Under these conditions the ith household’s utility function is 
given as: 










i i i i R s R s H s C c u u , , , =         ( 1 )  
where  i u  equals total household utility; ( i c ) represents household consumption and 
is positively dependent on the total expenditures on consumption goods:  0 > ∂ ∂ i i C c ; 
                                                 
6 See Statistics Canada (2003). These numbers are in part reflecting time of arrival in Canada. 
7 As reported by Elliott and Gray (2000), the responsibility to care for parents and grand parents are a key component of the 




i s ) are the social relations between family/household members which we assume 
to be positively dependent on accommodation or housing expenditures:  0 > ∂ ∂ i
f
c H s ; 
where (
p
i s ) are the social relations with relatives and friends which we assume to be 




c R s ; and 
(
g
i s ) denotes group membership which we assume to be positively related to the 




c R s . Further, it is assumed that the 




i i i i R R H C Y + + + = , i.e. no borrowing. 
In order to characterise the household’s remittance decisions with respect to 
other items in the consumption bundle, we allow for a two-stage budgeting process. 
Thus, in the first stage, the household may allocate total income across broad groups 
of expenditures. In the second stage, group expenditures determined in the first stage 
are distributed across the relevant expenditure classes in these groups. Under these 
conditions, we distinguish three cases: 
 
Case I: no two-stage budgeting 
If there is no two-stage budgeting, the household’s utility function has the form 
presented in eq. (1). Now, we differentiate (1) with respect to first  i c  and then 
f
i s , 
p
i s  
and 
g































        (1.1) 
Condition (1.1) implies that household utility is now maximised if the marginal 
utility from one more unit of home consumption equals the marginal utility from one 
more unit of social relations between household members, the marginal utility from 
one more unit of social relations to persons outside the household, and the marginal 
utility from one more unit of group membership. 
Remittances to relatives and/or friends will be zero ( 0 =
p
i R ) if the 
household’s marginal utility from social relations to relatives and/or friends living 
                                                                                                                                                          
and extended family commitments. On the other hand, such family obligations are less important in Western societies. Those 
obligations having been replaced by well developed social and financial systems.  
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outside the household is lower than the household’s marginal utility from 
consumption or the household’s marginal utility derived from social relations 
between household’s members or the household’s marginal utility gained from 
group membership for all possible levels of remittances to persons outside the 
















































I I .     (1.2) 
If condition (1.2) does not hold, the household’s remittances to persons outside the 
household will be positive ( 0 >
p
i R ). Thus, the amount remitted will be determined 
by the equilibrium condition (1.1) subject to  ( ) i i C c ,  ( ) i
f








i R s . 
Similarly, the household’s charity donations will be zero ( 0 =
ch
i R ) if the 
household’s marginal utility from group membership is lower than the household’s 
marginal utility from consumption or the household’s marginal utility from social 
relations between household’s members or the household’s marginal utility derived 
from social relations with relatives/friends living outside the household for all 
















































I I .     (1.3) 
If (1.3) does not hold, the household’s charity donations will be positive ( 0 >
ch
i R ). 
The amount donated will be determined by the equilibrium condition (1.1) subject to 
() i i C c ,  () i
f








i R s . 
 
Case II: two-stage budgeting – social relations 
A necessary and sufficient condition for the utility maximisation in two stages is the 
assumption of weak separability.8 We assume that the household’s utility function is 
separable and its income is allocated in a first step on two groups: (a) consumption 






i s s s + + ):  2 1 i i i Y Y Y + = . In the second step, the 
income assigned for social relations is then distributed across particular items in this 
group. The utility function, thus, takes the form: 
                                                 
8 See Deaton and Muellbauer (1993).  
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i i i i i s s s u c u u u + + = 2 1 ,        ( 2 )  
and utility maximisation occurs over two steps: 
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∂ 2 2 2        (2.2) 
Or, household utility is now maximised if simultaneously the marginal utility from 
one more unit of home consumption equals the marginal utility derived from one 
more unit of social relations, and the marginal utility from one more unit of social 
relations between household members equals the marginal utility from one more 
unit of social relations to persons outside the household and the marginal utility 
derived from one more unit of group membership. 
Remittances to relatives and/or friends will be zero ( 0 =
p
i R ) if: (a) the 
household’s marginal utility from social relations is lower than the household’s 
marginal utility from consumption; or (b) the household’s marginal utility from 
social relations is higher than the household’s marginal utility from consumption but 
the household’s marginal utility from social relations with relatives and/or friends 
living outside the household is lower than the household’s marginal utility from 
social relations between household members or the household’s marginal utility 
from group membership, for all possible levels of remittances to persons outside the 
household within the limits of the household’s budget allocated for social relations 
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I U .   (2.3) 
If condition (2.3) does not hold, the household’s remittances to persons outside the 
household will be positive ( 0 >
p
i R ). The amount remitted will be determined by the 
equilibrium conditions (2.1) and (2.2) subject to  ( ) i i C c ,  ( ) i
f








i R s . 
Similarly, the household’s charity donations will be zero ( 0 =
ch
i R ) if: (a) the 
household’s marginal utility from social relations is lower than the household’s  
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marginal utility from consumption; or (b) the household’s marginal utility from 
social relations is higher than the household’s marginal utility from consumption but 
the household’s marginal utility from group membership is lower than the 
household’s marginal utility from social relations between household members or 
the household’s marginal utility from social relations with relatives/friends living 
outside the household, for all possible levels of charity donations given the limits of 
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I U .   (2.4) 
If (2.4) does not hold, the household’s charity donations will be positive ( 0 >
ch
i R ). 
The amount remitted to charities will be determined by the equilibrium conditions 
(2.1) and (2.2) subject to  () i i C c ,  ( ) i
f








i R s . 
 
Case III: two-stage budgeting – social relations outside the household 
If we assume that the household’s utility function is separable on the following 
groups: (a) traditional household expenditures (
f
i i s c + ) and (b) social relations 




i s s + ), total income will be allocated in a first step on 
expenditures on household goods and expenditures on social relations outside the 
household:  4 3 i i i Y Y Y + = . The households utility function takes the form: 






i i i i s s u s c u u u + + = 4 3 ,        ( 3 )  
and utility maximisation occurs over two steps: 
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∂ 4 4         (3.2) 
Or household utility is now maximised if simultaneously the marginal utility from 
one more unit of traditional household expenditures equals the marginal utility 
derived from one more unit of social relations outside the household, and the  
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marginal utility from social relations to persons outside the household equals the 
marginal utility derived from group membership. 
Remittances to relatives and/or friends will be zero ( 0 =
p
i R ) if: (a) the 
household’s marginal utility from social relations outside the household is lower 
than the household’s marginal utility from traditional household expenditures; or (b) 
the household’s marginal utility gained from social relations outside the household is 
higher than the marginal utility gained from traditional household expenditures but 
the household’s marginal utility from social relations with relatives and/or friends 
living outside the household is lower than the household’s marginal utility from 
group membership, for all possible levels of remittances to persons outside the 
household within the limits of the household’s budget allocated for social relations 
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U .     (3.3) 
If condition (3.3) does not hold, the household’s remittances to persons outside the 
household will be positive ( 0 >
p
i R ). The amount remitted will be determined by the 
equilibrium conditions (3.1) and (3.2) subject to  ( ) i i C c ,  ( ) i
f








i R s . 
Similarly, the household’s charity donations will be zero ( 0 =
ch
i R ) if: (a) the 
household’s marginal utility from social relations outside the household is lower 
than the household’s marginal utility from traditional household expenditures; or (b) 
the household’s marginal utility from social relations outside the household is higher 
than the household’s marginal utility from traditional household expenditures but 
the household’s marginal utility from group membership is lower than the 
household’s marginal utility from social relations with relatives/friends living 
outside the household, for all possible levels of charitable donations within the limits 
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U .     (3.4) 
If (3.4) does not hold, the household’s charitable donations will be positive ( 0 >
ch
i R ). 
The amount donated will be determined by the equilibrium conditions (3.1) and (3.2) 
subject to  () i i C c ,  () i
f








i R s . 
 
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data sets used for this analysis with their respective sample sizes are taken from 
the 1992 (9,492) and 1996 (10,417) Family Expenditure Surveys (FAMEX), Income 
Statistics Division, Statistics Canada. Data were collected by means of filling out a 
detailed questionnaire during one or several interviews. Thus, income, expenditure 
and remittance data in the surveys are self-reported. 
The focus of the empirical part of this study is to investigate the possible 
differential patterns of private remittances by Canadian-born and foreign-born 
households. The Canadian-born population is used as reference group since 
presumably its members have no immediate attachments abroad. The survey years 
1992 and 1996 are of interest because they encompass a dynamic period of expanding 
Canadian immigration inflows which dramatically shifted to Asian source countries. 
This shift in turn may affect the size and distribution of foreign-born remittances.9 
These surveys, while extensive, have certain shortcomings. The 1992 survey 
includes a variable indicating the immigrant’s year of arrival, while the 1996 survey 
does not report it. We run the main analysis with pooled data for the 1992 and 1996 
surveys. However, when controlling for time spent in Canada since immigration, we 
use the 1992 survey only. 
The focus is on households over their normal economic life and limits the 
sample to those households whose head is older than 25. Only observations with 
positive and non-zero income, total expenditures and total remittances were kept in 
the regressions.10 Observations with negative expenditures for the different 
                                                 
9 In 1968 75% of Canadian immigrants came from Western Europe and North America, by 1992 25% came from these 
regions. 
10 Less than 10% of the households did not make any remittance to persons or charities, thus minimizing the possibility of a 
self-selection bias.  
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expenditure groups were excluded. Other observations with “masked” or “non-
stated” responses (i.e. education, region of residence, country of birth etc.) were 
excluded as well. In addition, the head of household is chosen as the highest income 
earner.11 This definition of the household head will allow us to categorize a foreign-
born (Canadian-born) household as one in which the highest earner is foreign-born 
(Canadian-born). The data from the pooled 1992 and 1996 surveys, given the above 
screening yields 16,318 surveyed households. 
 
Demographic, Income and Remittance Variables  
Data used in this study does not allow to differentiate between transfers sent inside 
or outside Canada. However, we can distinguish between a transfer to a person and 
to a charity. An inspection of the actual remittance data indicates that some 
households specialise in the type of transferred funds. Specifically, 11% of the 
households remit money exclusively to charitable organisations while over 18% 
remit money only to persons with the remaining 71% of the sample remitting to both 
individuals and charitable groups. We hypothesise that charitable remittances should 
respond differently to household income since these donations are tax deductible in 
Canada and do not imply a contractual motive to extended family members. 
Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics by birth status for the two survey 
years we included in our analysis: 1992 and 1996. The data only allow us to 
distinguish between Canadian-born and four foreign-born groups: North American 
and West European, South and East European, China, Asia and Oceania, and Others 
and Non-Stated. The last foreign-born group was excluded from the analysis since it 
was deemed too heterogeneous. 
The data show that the Asian immigrant population is younger, contains more 
males and has a significantly shorter immigration history in Canada than the 
remaining foreign-born groups. Also, Asian immigrant heads of households are 
more highly educated than the other foreign-born groups. However, Asians live in 
larger households and most of them have the spouse present. As a consequence, 
Asian immigrants remit on average the lowest absolute amounts either to other 
                                                 
11 We assume that the highest earner is the person who determines the household’s expenditure patterns.  
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households or charities. In contrast, the group with the largest absolute remittances, 
both to persons and charities, are the North American and West European immigrant 
households. They remitted about 35% more than Asian immigrant households in 
1996. We note that the North American and West European group have the highest 
proportion of household separated or divorced (which we assume to positively affect 
remittances to persons) and the highest income per household member (which we 
assume to positively affect both remittances to persons and charities). 
 
Table 1: Some Descriptive Data by Population for the 1992 and 1996 surveys (mean values) 
Variable Population  Group 
 Canadian  N.Am&W.Eu.  S&E  Europ.  Ch.,Asian&Oc. 
  1992 1996 1992 1996 1992 1996 1992 1996 
Female as HH head (prop.)  0.43 0.45 0.42 0.46 0.31 0.40 0.31 0.40 
Age of HH head  47.85 48.42 55.13 54.79 53.41 54.70 45.86 44.83 
Education  2.74 2.93 3.09 3.05 2.39 2.47 3.30 3.51 
Married with HH member (prop.)  0.65 0.64 0.63 0.65 0.73 0.75 0.79 0.75 
Single – never married (prop.)  0.13 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.12 
Separated/Divorced/Widowed (prop.)  0.22 0.23 0.30 0.28 0.23 0.21 0.11 0.13 
HH size  2.61 2.54 2.41 2.35 2.75 2.74 3.31 3.49 
Home ownership (prop.)  0.64 0.66 0.68 0.69 0.76 0.75 0.56 0.71 
Years since immigration  n.a. n.a.  31.52 n.a. 28.89 n.a. 13.88 n.a. 
HH income after taxes  38,382 40,012 38,887 41,435 36,905 39,535 40,831 45,156
Income per HH member  14,695 15,769 16,136 17,595 13,425 14,403 12,332 12,953
Net change in assets  2,014 3,839 2,048 4,500 1,581 2,334 2,623 2,877 
Remittances to persons  1,177 1,352 1,861 1,855 1,455 1,875 1,402 1,369 
Remittances to charities  370 397 645 588 339 407 393 381 
Observations  6,893  7,077  545 631 289 343 196 344 
Source: Own calculations; Family Expenditures Survey 1992 and 1996, Statistics Canada. 
Notes: Education levels are 1 = less than 9 years, 2 = some or completed secondary, 3 = some post-
secondary, 4 = Post secondary degree, 5 = University degree; Monetary values in 1992 dollars 
 
The patterns of remittances as a percentage of income per household vary across the 
defined immigrant groups. For example, regardless of foreign-born status 
households remitted about 1% of their income as charitable donations. In contrast, 
their remittances to persons differ by place of birth. Canadian and Asian immigrant 
households remitted about 3% of their income, while North American and West 
European and South and East European immigrant households remitted 4.5% of 
their income to individuals outside the household. 
A further, more in-depth analysis of the household remittances data in two 
particular areas adds context to the earlier model and ultimately conditions the tests.  
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First, a preliminary analysis of the data indicates that the mean values for 
remittances are dominated by a limited number of households. Figure 1 plots the 
cumulative rank against the cumulative share of remittances by all households which 
made a positive remittance in 1992 and 1996.12 We observe that some 30% of these 
households transferred about 80% of all remittances. The remaining 70% of the 
households transferred only 20% of the observed remittances in the pooled 
1992/1996 sample. The Gini coefficient thus, assumed a high value of 0.70. 
Households, regardless of their foreign-born status, revealed a nearly identical 
distribution pattern which indicates that a only few donate most of the observed 
remittances. The question is: how does this distribution compare with the 
distribution of households’ after-tax income that presumably determines the ability 
to remit? Figure 1 reports a much more equal size distribution of income (Lorenz 
curve) with a calculated Gini equal to 0.46 and with the highest 30% of earners 
receiving about 60% of total cumulated income. 
Figure 1: Lorenz curves for income and remittances 
 
Source: Own calculations; Family Expenditures Survey  
1992 and 1996, Statistics Canada. 
 
Thus, we conclude that given this disparity in remittances across income groups any 
econometric test must group the data by income class.  
 
Econometric Specification 
It is a basic premise of this paper that the act of private remittances is embedded in 
the household’s utility maximisation framework and is, thus, a part of the 
                                                 
12 We omitted zero values to calculate this Gini index, which is thus a lower bound estimate of the true degree of inequality.  
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household’s allocation process across a general expenditure system. To reflect this, 
the chosen demand system estimated is the Linear Approximate/Almost Ideal 
Demand System (LA/AIDS) since it conforms to most of the underlying utility 
maximization restrictions.13 Hence, for the ith commodity, the model can be specified 
as follows: 
( ) i i
j
j ij i i p y p w ε β γ α + + + = ∑
* / ln ln        ( 4 )  
where  y q p w i i i / × =  is the budget share of the ith good,  j p  is the price of the jth good, 
y  represents total expenditures, and 
* p  is a Stone price index (i.e.  ∑ = i i p w p ln ln
* ). 
To insure that this demand system conforms to the recognised properties of the 
utility maximisation model outlined in (1), equation (4) must satisfy the adding up, 
homogeneity and symmetry conditions: 





















0 γ      (4.1) 







0 γ         (4.2) 
c)  symmetry:  ji ij γ γ =         (4.3) 
Provided that (4.1), (4.2), and (4.3) hold, equation (4) represents a system of demand 
functions that are homogenous of degree zero in prices and total expenditures and 
also satisfy the Slutsky symmetry conditions. The LA/AIDS is simple to interpret: in 
the case of constant relative prices and “real” expenditure (
* / p y ), the budget shares 
are constant. This is the natural starting point for the predictions using the model. 
Changes in relative prices work through the terms  ij γ ; each  ij γ  represents 100 times 
the effect on the ith budget share of a 1% increase in the ith price with 
* / p y  held 
constant. Changes in real expenditures operate through  i β ; these add to zero and are 
positive for luxuries and negative for necessities. Using the estimate  i β , Engel 







+ =           (4.4) 
                                                 
13 Later, these conditions are formally tested to insure that the expenditure functions are consistent with utility maximisation 
conditions.  
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where  i e  is the Engel elasticity and 
*
i w  is the mean share of expenditures on the ith 
good for the entire sample. The Engel elasticity is greater than unity for luxuries, less 
then unity for necessities, and equal to one for normal goods. 
A demographically enhanced demand system can be written as follows: 
() i k ik i
n
j




/ ln ln      (4.5) 
where  k X  represents a set of demographic control variables, drawn from the model, 
that depict the life-cycle stage of the immigrant and Canadian households. 
Finally, we augment our demand system to allow us to estimate both entry 
and assimilation effects with respect to the immigrant remittance behaviour: 
() ()i
s
s is is k ik i
n
j




/ ln ln    (4.6) 
where  s IG  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the household belongs to 
immigrant group s and zero otherwise. D denotes the duration of the foreign-born 
household residence (i.e. vintage of an immigrant household). This extended model 
is designed to match the description of the behaviour of immigrants in the sociology 
literature. There, immigrants are assumed to arrive with a set of cultural values and 
tastes which are different from those of the natives; this is reflected by possible non-
zero values for  is φ .14 Over time, via assimilation, the behaviour of immigrants may 
become more similar to that of the host group. In our model this would be the case 
when the sign of  is θ  is opposite to the sign of  is φ . In this case, the immigration 
and/or cultural effects would vanish after  is is θ φ  years of residence in the host 
country.15 
 
Two-stage budgeting and weak separability  
Given the above model specification, we invoked the concept of weak separability of 
a utility function over a given set of commodities to characterize the household 
expenditure process. This condition in turn implies that the marginal rate of 
                                                 
14 Thus, the set of parameters  is φ  can be interpreted first as a general immigration entry effect. If  is φ  differs significantly 
across immigrant groups, we interpret this as evidence for country specific cultural effects as well. 
15 See Carroll et al. (1994) for this interpretation.  
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substitution between any two goods within one group of goods is independent of the 
level of consumption of any other group of goods. If this condition holds, then it is 
correct to specify the demand for these product groups separately. The sole 
connection between the commodity groups is then via the income or expenditure 
effect. 
Allen's partial elasticities of substitution allow us to test for the existence of 
weak separability. The utility function is weakly separable into the commodity 
groups (A) and (B) if: 
1.  the partial substitution elasticities between different commodities of the group 
(A) and of the group (B) are identical, i.e.  σ σ = lm  for all  A l∈  and  B m∈ , and 
2.  the utility sub-functions are homothetic, i.e.  0 = ∑
l
l β  and  0 = ∑
m
m β . 
From the relation between substitution elasticities and compensated price elasticities 
we have: 
* / 1 lm m lm w Θ × = σ . The compensated price elasticities are calculated as 
j i ij j ij w w w /
* γ + = Θ  for  j i ≠ . Thus, we have: 
  m l lm lm w w / 1 γ σ + = .         (4.7) 
To test if restriction (4.7) is satisfied with the data used, we apply a likelihood ratio 
test comparing the system of equations with and without the restriction imposed. 
 
Empirical Results 
LA/AIDS is a system of seemingly unrelated equations with identical regressors and 
cross-equation restrictions, e.g.  ji ij γ γ = . For its estimation we, thus, use Zellner’s 








1. This restriction implies further restrictions on the right hand 







0 ε . The residuals are linear dependent and their covariance 
matrix is singular.16 Green (2003) shows that the solution to the singularity problem 
is to arbitrarily drop one of the equations and estimate the remainder. The residuals 
covariance matrix of the system with  1 − n  equations is non-singular. The coefficients 
                                                 
16 See Hansen (1993).  
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of the nth equation result from the “adding-up” restriction. Furthermore, in the SUR-
model, when all equations have the same regressors, the efficient estimator is single-
equation ordinary least squares; i.e. GLS is the same as OLS. Thus, we use in this 
analysis SUR and OLS alternatively: SUR in most cases, in particular when we 
impose cross-equation restrictions and OLS for single equation estimations. 
Furthermore, structural breaks may occur in the sample since the data set is 
pooled. To account for this we estimated the system of equations with variables 
which captured the interaction between year dummies and the expenditure variable. 
However, the difference between the coefficients of these interaction variables is 
quite small, implying that the expenditure elasticity is about the same for 1992 and 
1996 (as supported by the F-test). Thus, it is reasonable to run the analysis with the 
pooled sample.17 
 
Homogeneity and symmetry 
One of the tasks of this empirical analysis is to test if the restrictions implied by 
utility theory hold for the demand equations when including the unique expenditure 
items relating to remittances. The homogeneity restriction is first tested by running 
separate OLS regressions for each commodity group in the study, with and without 
the restriction imposed. Then, we tested for homogeneity, symmetry and both 
homogeneity and symmetry by running SUR for the whole system, with and without 
the restrictions imposed. A likelihood ratio test is used to check the restrictions in the 
uncontrolled for demographics LA/AIDS model (eq. 4).18 
The test results for the homogeneity and symmetry conditions are presented 
in Table 2. Since we assumed different expenditure patterns for the four population 
groups in the study, we ran the tests for each group separately. In fact, different 
results are generated by the restriction tests. By running separate OLS regressions, 
the hypothesis of homogeneity cannot be rejected in six out of ten equations in the 
system for the Canadian-born population, seven out of ten equations for the South 
and East European immigrant population, and eight out of ten equations for the 
                                                 
17 The system exhibits heteroskedasticity. Tests like White and Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg reject the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity. The source of heteroskedasticity is uncertain. Moreover, weighting the OLS regressions by the deflated 
logarithm of expenditure does not eliminate heteroskedasticity.  
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North American and West European and Asian immigrant population. When 
running the entire system, the homogeneity restriction cannot be rejected in the case 
of the Asian immigrant case. Finally, the symmetry restriction is rejected by the chi-
squared statistics for all population groups. 
 
Table 2: Homogeneity and Symmetry 
Commodity Group  Population 
 Canadian  N.Am.&W.Eu.  S&E  Eu.  Ch.,As.&Oc. 
 chi




Food  0.04  0.844  0.01  0.933  0.00  0.973  0.64  0.425 
Shelter  32.13 0.000 7.16 0.008 1.16 0.281  0.14  0.713 
HH op&fur  0.88  0.348  0.06  0.800  3.71 0.054 2.40 0.121 
Clothing  1.50  0.221  6.71 0.010  10.53 0.001  0.74  0.390 
Transportation  0.54  0.461  1.20  0.274  0.64  0.425  0.26  0.608 
Heath&Pers.Care  22.04 0.000 0.80 0.370  0.69  0.408  4.72 0.030 
Recreation  0.24  0.625  0.00  0.993  0.09  0.768  0.19  0.666 
Tabacco&Alcohol  34.22 0.000 0.54 0.461  0.40  0.527  3.85 0.050 
Remit. to persons  0.00  0.966  0.07  0.797  0.14  0.705  2.51  0.113 
Remit. to charities  15.34 0.000 0.01 0.923  4.53 0.033 0.58 0.446 
System           
Homogeneity  100.65 0.000 14.93 0.093 20.25 0.016 14.26 0.113 
Symmetry  7676.51 0.000 260.85 0.000 110.91 0.000 102.72 0.000 
Homog.&Symmetry  7829.59 0.000 267.43 0.000 131.07 0.000 118.42 0.000 
Note: Significant results appear in bold type. 
 
Expenditure elasticities 
Given the earlier reported stylised facts, we will estimate Engel elasticities for 
Canadian-born, and foreign-born residents across income groups in an LA/AIDS 
system and under an uncontrolled as well as a controlled setting.19 
The model includes controls for gender, age, household size, marital status, 
education, house ownership and savings variables to capture the main socio-
economic life-cycle arguments which may influence the household’s decision to 
remit money outside the household. If the model is correct and demographic 
                                                                                                                                                          
18 For the prices used for estimating the system see Appendix A. 
19 Test results for weak separability of expenditure groups suggest that expenditures on social relations (i.e. housing, 
remittances to persons and remittances to charities) are not weakly separable from expenditures for consumption (Case II of 
the theoretical model), for all population groups. We, thus, found no evidence that housing is a direct substitute for 
remittances. However, Asian households treat remittances to persons and remittances to charities as weakly separable from 
the other expenditures, implying that only in the case of Asian households remittances to charities act as a direct substitute to 
remittances to persons. Therefore, we include in the LA/AIDS estimates for the Asian group only two equations (one for the 
share of remittances to persons and one for the share of remittances to charities) and total remittances as an independent 
argument (instead of total expenditures).  
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arguments condition remittances then significant differences should arise between 
the controlled and uncontrolled elasticity measures. 
 
Table 3: Expenditure Elasticities for Remittances to Persons Calculated from LA/AIDS, 1992/1996 
 
 Population  Uncontrolled  Controlled 
  Group  Income Group  Income Group 
    all  top Y/2  bottom Y/2 all  top Y/2  bottom Y/2
Canadian  1.07 1.27  1.19  1.88 1.73  1.83 
N.Am.&W.Eu.  1.29 1.43  1.67  2.28 2.14  2.23 
S&E European  1.01 1.11  1.09  2.07 1.59  2.29 
Unrestricted 
Ch.,As.&Oc.  1.09 1.12  1.09  1.10 1.13  1.09 
Canadian  1.09 1.25  1.20  1.86 1.70  1.78 
N.Am.&W.Eu.  1.29 1.43  1.66  2.25 2.10  2.18 




Ch.,As.&Oc.  1.09 1.12  1.09  1.10 1.13  1.09 
Notes: Elasticity is computed through the formula  ) ( 1
*
i i i w e β + = , where 
*
i w
 is the actual mean 
expenditure share and  i β  is the estimated household income coefficient. 
 
Table 3 reports the estimated expenditure elasticities for the pooled 1992 and 1996 
surveys with and without imposing restrictions for homogeneity and symmetry. We 
separate our results further by foreign-birth status and income group to capture any 
effects owing to the immigrant origins or their position in Canada’s income 
distribution. Given these categories, the range of calculated values for the 
expenditure elasticities indicates that remittances to persons (i.e. expenditures on 
social relations with relatives and/or friends) appear as a normal good or a luxury 
item across the sampled households.20 
The results indicate significant differences in the remittance activity of the four 
population groups across the cited income classes and imply that cultural differences 
affect expenditures to maintain relationships with relatives and/or friends. The 
uncontrolled elasticity estimates are above unity for the Canadian-born and North 
American and West European immigrant households and close to unity for South 
and East European and Asian immigrant households. North Americans and West 
Europeans seem to treat expenditures on social relations with relatives/friends as a 
luxury item, while South and East European and Asian immigrants treat these 
                                                 
20 For expenditure elasticities for the entire system see Appendix B. Canadian elasticity estimates as reported by Didukh 
(2001, 2002) and Geiger (2002) over a wide variety of commodities are within the range reported here with the exception of 
the Chinese values.  
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expenditures as a normal good. Once controls for gender, age, education, marital 
status, number of persons in the household, house ownership and saving activity are 
added, the elasticity values regardless of foreign-birth status (except Asian) greatly 
exceed unity. This implies that in general in this controlled environment 
expenditures on social relations with relatives/friends are treated as luxury goods 
too. The exception is the Asian group which considers expenditures on kinship ties 
as a normal good regardless of the imposition of controls. Expenditure elasticities 
with the homogeneity and symmetry restrictions mimic those of the unrestricted 
estimation.  
 
Table 4: Expenditure Elasticities for Remittances to Charities Calculated from LA/AIDS, 1992/1996 
 
 Population  Uncontrolled  Controlled 
  Group  Income Group  Income Group 
    all  top Y/2  bottom Y/2 all  top Y/2  bottom Y/2
Canadian  0.60 0.48  0.47  0.93 0.72  0.89 
N.Am.&W.Eu.  0.78 0.65  1.03  1.10 0.76  1.20 
S&E European  0.54 0.97  0.32  1.25 0.95  1.27 
Unrestricted 
Ch.,As.&Oc.  0.79 0.76  0.78  0.77 0.73  0.79 
Canadian  0.67 0.56  0.50  0.92 0.75  0.87 
N.Am.&W.Eu.  0.79 0.66  1.02  1.08 0.73  1.14 




Ch.,As.&Oc.  0.79 0.76  0.78  0.77 0.73  0.78 
Notes: Elasticity is computed through the formula  ) ( 1
*
i i i w e β + = , where 
*
i w
 is the actual mean 
expenditure share and  i β  is the estimated household income coefficient. 
 
Table 4 focuses on charitable donations of households by their income class. In an 
uncontrolled setting, across all population and income groups, the households 
handled charitable donations as a necessity. These results are repeated in a controlled 
setting (North American and West European and South and East European 
immigrant households in the bottom half of the sample’s income distribution are an 
exception). 
Some tentative conclusions are in order. The cultural background of the head 
of household is a key determinant of the household’s expenditures aimed to 
maintain different types of social relations. On the one hand, Canadian-born and 
immigrant households from North America and Europe treat remittances to persons 
outside the household (i.e. kinship relations) as a luxury good. Thus, for North  
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Americans and Europeans the relationship within a household (i.e. the core family) is 
of primary importance and only when total household consumption is large enough 
these households become more generous with other relatives and friends.  
On the other hand, Asian households consider expenditures on kinship 
relations (i.e. remittances to persons) mainly as a normal good: the remitted share 
being more stable when related to total expenditure changes. It seems, therefore, that 
Asian immigrants have stronger ties with the extended family and share a greater 
fraction of their income with them, irrespective of their income level. 
Finally, most foreign households (i.e. North American, West European and 
Asian) regarded religious/charitable remittances as a necessity, since these transfers 
are small and fall as a share of total expenditures when total household expenditures 
rise. This is actually in line with the general experience, that religious participation 
weakens while a person/household becomes wealthier. Exceptions are North 
American and European immigrant households in the bottom income half, who seem 
to be more attached to their social/religious group. They may be using 




We now turn to the effects of household demographic characteristics on remittance 
behaviour. We argue that remittances are embedded in the household’s life cycle 
experiences and illustrate the household’s remittance experience with a series of 
simulations over time. These simulations are depicted in the Figures 2 and 3 and are 
build on the reported estimates for remittances to persons and to charities in 
Appendix C. In short, for each representative household we place the mean values 
for all the model’s variables (except age) and cross multiply by the relevant 
coefficients. This produces the household’s estimated remittances share by age for its 
constituent parts.21 
Figure 2 reveals several important features of the remittance experience over 
time and across various population groups. First, there exists a substantial difference 
                                                 
21 When simulating the absolute amount of remittances, we use estimates derived from the controlled LA/AIDS model with 
the dependent variable and the independent variables of the basic model multiplied by total expenditures.  
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in remittances to persons as a share of household expenditures between Asian 
immigrants and all other groups. The share of remittances to persons as a fraction of 
total expenditures rises with the age of the household head for all other groups from 
about 2.5-3.0% at age 25 to about 6% at age 70. Related to our theoretical model, this 
would mean that the preference of the households of these groups for social relations 
with persons outside the household increases with age. This is probably owing to the 
fact that the number of nuclear family members (with whom we argue that North 
Americans and Europeans have stronger ties) living outside the household changes 
over time. Thus, remittances increase while the household head ages and his/her 
own children move outside the household, and rise further when he/she has 
grandchildren. 
 
Figure 2: HH Remittances to Persons by Population Group during Life Cycle (share and absolute) 
 
Source: Own calculations; Family Expenditures Survey (FAMEX) 1992 and 1996, Statistics Canada. 
 
The hypothesis, that the share of expenditures remitted to persons outside the 
households increases for North American and European households with the 
number of the nuclear family members living outside the household, is confirmed 
also by the estimate results of the marital status variables. If the spouse lives outside 
the household or the household head is divorced22, the household remits a 
significantly larger share of its expenditures to persons outside the household.23 
                                                 
22 The FAMEX marital status group includes widowed persons as well. However, we expect that this will not bias our results. 
Both separated, divorced and widowed household heads might have a greater propensity to remit. Separated and divorced 
household heads might remit more because they have a greater number of close relatives (i.e. [ex]spouse, children) living 
outside the household. At the same time, widowed household heads might invest more in relations to persons outside the 
household (i.e. remit more) in order to substitute for their loss of social relations within the household. 
23 See Appendix C, Table C-1.  
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The pattern of remittances to persons for Asian immigrant households 
remains, however, relatively flat over their whole life cycle at about 4% of total 
expenditures. We believe that this is due to the fact that in the case of Asians the 
extended family plays an important role in their social life, and number of the 
extended family members living outside the household is more stable over lifetime. 
This hypothesis is also confirmed by noting that Asian households where the spouse 
or ex-spouse lives outside the household do not remit significantly different amounts 
when compared to Asian married couples or singles.24 
If we now turn to the simulated absolute  values remitted, we generate 
patterns which conform to our earlier reported stylised facts. In short, North 
American and West European immigrant households remit the greatest absolute 
amounts and Canadian-born households the least, with an almost constant difference 
(about CA$ 400) between the two groups over the households’ lifetimes. 
We can further recognise important differences in the households’ remittance 
patterns. For the Canadian-born and North American and West European 
households respectively, the remittance pattern in absolute terms is almost linear and 
increasing. For South and East European immigrant households it is convex with a 
minimum of about 1,500 CA$/year at age 45 and for Asian immigrant households it 
is also convex with a minimum of about 1,300 CA$/year at age 60. 
 
Figure 3: HH Remittances to Charities by Population Group during Life Cycle (share and absolute) 
 
Source: Own calculations; Family Expenditures Survey (FAMEX) 1992 and 1996, Statistics Canada. 
 
                                                 
24 See Appendix C, Table C-1.  
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Figure 3 depicts the simulated charitable remittances by various households. In 
general all household groups (except Asian) increase their minuscule charitable 
donations from 0.5% at age 25 to around 3% by age 70. Additionally, charitable 
donations, both as a share and in absolute values, tend to converge over the life cycle 
across various population groups with the exception of the charitable donations of 
the Asian immigrant households. 
 
Entry and Assimilation Effects 
Table 5 reports the results of estimating the augmented share equation with the entry 
and assimilation effects in 1992.25 The reported standard errors are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity.26 
 
Table 5: Entry and Assimilation Effects, 1992 
  Remittances to Persons  Remittances to Charities 
 Entry  Assimilation  Entry Assimilation 
Population 
Group  is φ   F-test 
(p-val.)  is θ   F-test 
(p-val.) is φ   F-test 
(p-val.) is θ   F-test 
(p-val.)
N.Am&W.Eu.  0.0065 -0.0002 -0.0108  0.0004 
  [0.0079] [0.0003]  [0.0040]*** [0.0002]** 
S&E European  -0.0078 0.0006  -0.0030  -0.000003 
  [0.0097] [0.0004]  [0.0024] [0.0001] 









Robust standard errors in brackets         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
 
The  is φ  coefficient for remittances to persons is significant only for the Asian 
immigrant group. The  is φ  coefficients are significantly different between immigrant 
groups (see F-test, Table 5), implying the existence of cultural effects in the remittance 
behaviour of households. Moreover, there is no evidence for convergence to the 
Canadian-born norm over time. 
With respect to remittances to charities, the  is φ  coefficient is significant for 
North American and West European and Asian households. In addition, the result of 
the F-test shows that  is φ  is significantly different across immigrant groups, which 
suggests that there is evidence for cultural effects on charitable donations at time of 
                                                 
25 The 1996 survey data do not contain a question on the number of years in Canada, so only the 1992 data was employed.  
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entry too. Assimilation to the Canadian-born norm occurs only in the case of North 
American and West European households after about 28 years. 
 
Conclusions 
This study illustrates the effect of Canada’s immigration policy on remittances. Since 
permanent immigration is encouraged, only modest levels of remittances occur in 
this context, amounting to less than 5% of the overall household expenditures. In 
addition, these transfers were highly concentrated with the highest 30% of earners 
remitting 80% of all remittances. However, only 9% of the households did not remit 
to persons outside the household or charities. Finally, only 25% of the foreign-born 
transfers were in the form of charitable donations, while the other 75% were in the 
form of remittances to persons. 
We offered a utility maximising household model to explain the remittance 
options. The model argued that these alternatives were a by-product of the head of 
household’s preferences for different kinds of social relations, i.e. with other 
households members, with relatives and/or friends living outside the household and 
group membership. 
Further, we use a traditional expenditure framework with a unique 
composition of goods to illustrate the motivations to remit by immigrants. We 
theorise that remittances to persons outside the household represent transfers to 
maintain social relations with relatives and friends and religious/charitable 
remittances are expenditures which foster group membership. In addition, we 
hypothesize that expenditures on housing enhance social relations between 
household members. 
By testing first for weak separability, we found no evidence for a direct 
substitution relationship between housing and remittances, for none of the 
population groups included in this study (i.e. Canadian, North American and West 
European, South and East European, and Asian). However, Asian households treat 
remittances to persons and remittances to charities as weakly separable from the 
                                                                                                                                                          
26 The results without adjusting for heteroskedasticity are similar.  
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other expenditures, implying that for them remittances to charities act as a direct 
substitute for remittances to persons. 
Estimated Engel elasticities with an LA/AIDS model, in both a naive 
formulation and with extended demographic controls, confirmed in general that 
(with the important exception of Asian sourced immigrants) remittances outside the 
household were considered a luxury good. Thus, for the North American and 
European groups27, the relationship among the household members (i.e. the core 
family) is of primary importance. Only when total household consumption is large 
enough do these households become more altruistic towards other relatives and 
friends. 
However, we also found evidence that the preference of North American and 
European households for social relations with persons outside the household 
increases with age. This is probably due to the fact that the number of nuclear family 
members living outside the household changes over time. Thus, remittances would 
increase while the household head ages and his/her own children move outside the 
household, and rise further when he/she becomes a grandparent. A robustness 
check involves a check of estimated results of the marital status variables. If the 
spouse lives outside the household or the household head is divorced, the household 
remits a significantly greater share of its expenditures to persons outside the 
household. 
On the other hand, Asian households treat kinship relations (i.e. remittances 
to persons) mainly as a normal good: the remitted share being more stable when 
related to total expenditure changes. It seems, therefore, that Asian immigrants have 
stronger ties with the extended family and not predominantly with the core family 
like the North American and European population groups. Thus, they share a given 
fraction of their income with their relatives, irrespective of their income level. 
This outcome is reinforced by the observation that the share of expenditures 
remitted to persons by Asian immigrant households remains relatively flat over their 
whole life cycle, probably because the number of extended family members living 
outside the household is more stable over lifetime. Additionally, Asian households 
                                                 
27 Canadian-born, immigrants from North American and Western Europe, and immigrants from South and Eastern Europe.  
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where the spouse or ex-spouse lives outside the household do not remit significantly 
different amounts when compared to Asian married couples. 
A robustness proof for the existence of cultural differences in the remittance 
behaviour of households is the fact that only Asian households remit significantly 
more of their expenditures to persons upon arriving in Canada. Furthermore, there is 
no evidence for convergence of transfers to the Canadian-born-norm over time. 
With respect to charitable donations, these are regarded as gifts  by most 
foreign-born households, since they are small and falling when expenditures rise. 
The only exception are North American and European immigrant households in the 
bottom income half, which are more altruistically inclined toward 
charitable/religious groups. They perhaps use charitable/religious spending to 
improve their own status in the group, as the household income rises. Moreover, 
when controlling for entry and assimilation with respect to the remittance behaviour 
to charities, we found evidence for cultural differences between the four population 
groups too.  
In sum, the cultural background of the household members and thus the 
social/family norms of the group they belong to seems to be a key determinant of the 
households remittance behaviour.  
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Appendix A: Regional Price Indices 
 
Year Region  Expenditure  Group 













1992 Atlantic  98.2 80.4  98.1 96.5  75.9 88.7  101.3  104.5 
1992 Quebec  97.8 72.0  96.7 99.7  90.1 90.7  100.1  101.1 
1992 Ontario  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0 
1992 Prairies  98.6 75.1  92.1  102.8  77.5 92.2  94.6  95.1 
1992 BC  104.7 102.0  99.2  99.8 97.9 88.0  97.1  104.4 
1996 Atlantic  109.7 84.1  106.0  101.3  90.0 101.9  104.5  90.2 
1996 Quebec  102.8 75.5  101.1 97.9  92.8 102.6  97.1  72.7 
1996 Ontario  105.4 108.1  105.4 105.3  112.1 98.7  104.1  73.8 
1996 Prairies  104.0 79.0  95.2 105.2  80.7 94.4  95.7  89.8 
1996 BC  114.3 109.9  102.8 103.4  129.9 92.2  101.3  100.4 
Base: Ontario 1992. 
Source: Pendakur (2001), Didukh (2001), and Browning and Thomas (1998a,1998b). 
 
 
Prices variables used for eight (out of ten) commodity groups (1. Food, 2. Shelter, 3. 
Household Operations and Furnishing, 4. Clothing, 5. Transportation, 6. Personal and Health 
Care, 7. Recreation, Education and Reading Material , 8. Tobacco and Alcoholic Beverages) 
included in this study are Consumer Price Indices that vary over time and across five regions 
(Atlantic Provinces, Quebec, Ontario, Prairies, and British Columbia) and are assumed to be 
fixed within the regions. For the other two expenditure groups (9. Remittances to Persons 
Outside the Household, and 10. Remittances to Charities) we computed prices indices based 
on the CPIs of the eight commodity groups mentioned before. We argue that the value of one 
remitted dollar to a person outside the household equals to the forgone consumption of the 
household for that dollar. Thus, we calculated for each household in our sample the CPIs of 
Remittances to Persons as sum of the CPIs of the eight expenditure groups presented above, 
weighted by the respective share of the expenditure group in total expenditures. Charitable 
donations are tax deductible. Thus, the price for one dollar donated to charities equals to 
value of forgone consumption minus the tax deduction received for the donation of that one 
dollar. The CPIs for Remittances to Charities are computed by the following formula 
( ) () i i poh i chaor Taxr CPI CPI − × − + = 1 100 100 , , . Where:  i chaor CPI ,  is the CPI of Remittances to 
Charities for the ith household;  i poh CPI ,  is the CPI of Remittances to Persons for the ith 
household; and  i Taxr  stands for the tax rate applicable for the ith household.28 
                                                 
28 The tax rates are computed distinctively for each household through a combination of the federal and provincial tax rates. 




Table B-1: Expenditure Elasticities Calculated from LA/AIDS, Unrestricted (1992/1996) 
 
Population Expenditure  Uncontrolled  Controlled 
Group  Group  Income Group  Income Group 
    all  top Y/2  bottom Y/2 all  top Y/2  bottom Y/2
Canadian  Food  0.74 0.67  0.72  0.62 0.60  0.62 
  Shelter  0.68 0.70  0.64  0.68 0.69  0.67 
  HH op&fur  1.02 1.06  0.96  0.99 1.08  0.96 
  Cloth  1.30 1.20  1.30  1.23 1.19  1.28 
  Transport  1.58 1.49  1.89  1.57 1.45  1.78 
  Heath&Pers.Care  0.85 0.77  0.90  0.85 0.75  0.96 
  Recreation  1.41 1.32  1.42  1.32 1.29  1.32 
  Tabacco&Alcohol  0.95 0.88  1.11  1.02 1.04  1.07 
  Rem. to persons  1.07 1.27  1.19  1.88 1.73  1.83 
  Rem. to charities  0.60 0.48  0.47  0.93 0.72  0.89 
N. American &  Food  0.77 0.73  0.69  0.63 0.66  0.55 
W. European  Shelter  0.68 0.70  0.67  0.69 0.66  0.74 
  HH op&fur  1.07 1.16  1.03  1.05 1.18  0.98 
  Cloth  1.31 1.27  1.20  1.14 1.18  1.16 
  Transport  1.44 1.27  1.66  1.42 1.31  1.57 
  Heath&Pers.Care  0.79 0.74  0.77  0.75 0.59  0.86 
  Recreation  1.50 1.46  1.63  1.33 1.32  1.49 
  Tabacco&Alcohol  1.01 0.67  1.15  0.94 0.81  0.98 
  Rem. to persons  1.29 1.43  1.67  2.28 2.14  2.23 
  Rem. to charities  0.78 0.65  1.03  1.10 0.76  1.20 
S&E  Food  0.77 0.69  0.72  0.64 0.62  0.68 
European  Shelter  0.60 0.62  0.53  0.60 0.67  0.53 
  HH op&fur  0.99 0.99  1.01  0.90 0.99  0.95 
  Cloth  1.29 1.25  1.14  1.16 1.24  1.09 
  Transport  1.57 1.52  2.04  1.52 1.43  1.73 
  Heath&Pers.Care  0.95 0.87  0.91  1.02 0.87  1.01 
  Recreation  1.47 1.35  1.40  1.25 1.24  1.16 
  Tabacco&Alcohol  1.22 1.12  1.39  1.17 1.39  0.99 
  Rem. to persons  1.01 1.11  1.09  2.07 1.59  2.29 
  Rem. to charities  0.54 0.97  0.32  1.25 0.95  1.27 
Chinese,  Rem. to persons  1.09 1.12  1.09  1.10 1.13  1.09 




Table B-2: Expenditure Elasticities Calculated from LA/AIDS, Restricted (1992/1996) 
 
Population Expenditure  Uncontrolled  Controlled 
Group  Group  Income Group  Income Group 
    all  top Y/2  bottom Y/2 all  top Y/2  bottom Y/2
Canadian  Food  0.77 0.66  0.74  0.61 0.57  0.61 
  Shelter  0.67 0.76  0.63  0.73 0.78  0.72 
  HH op&fur  1.04 1.03  0.97  0.96 1.02  0.93 
  Cloth  1.33 1.18  1.31  1.20 1.14  1.24 
  Transport  1.53 1.53  1.87  1.59 1.52  1.81 
  Heath&Pers.Care  0.85 0.72  0.91  0.81 0.69  0.92 
  Recreation  1.43 1.26  1.44  1.27 1.19  1.27 
  Tabacco&Alcohol  0.91 0.79  1.08  0.95 0.95  0.99 
  Rem. to persons  1.09 1.25  1.20  1.86 1.70  1.78 
  Rem. to charities  0.67 0.56  0.50  0.92 0.75  0.87 
N. American &  Food  0.78 0.72  0.70  0.62 0.65  0.54 
W. European  Shelter  0.67 0.72  0.66  0.71 0.70  0.77 
  HH op&fur  1.08 1.15  1.03  1.04 1.18  0.97 
  Cloth  1.31 1.25  1.20  1.14 1.16  1.15 
  Transport  1.44 1.28  1.67  1.42 1.31  1.56 
  Heath&Pers.Care  0.79 0.72  0.76  0.75 0.58  0.84 
  Recreation  1.50 1.43  1.62  1.32 1.29  1.47 
  Tabacco&Alcohol  1.00 0.68  1.17  0.93 0.82  0.99 
  Rem. to persons  1.29 1.43  1.66  2.25 2.10  2.18 
  Rem. to charities  0.79 0.66  1.02  1.08 0.73  1.14 
S&E  Food  0.77 0.69  0.71  0.64 0.62  0.66 
European  Shelter  0.59 0.63  0.53  0.60 0.67  0.56 
  HH op&fur  1.00 0.99  1.03  0.91 0.99  0.91 
  Cloth  1.28 1.25  1.11  1.16 1.24  1.08 
  Transport  1.59 1.52  2.02  1.52 1.42  1.73 
  Heath&Pers.Care  0.97 0.88  0.94  1.02 0.87  1.01 
  Recreation  1.49 1.35  1.43  1.26 1.24  1.11 
  Tabacco&Alcohol  1.20 1.12  1.35  1.16 1.39  0.97 
  Rem. to persons  0.98 1.06  1.08  2.08 1.60  2.36 
  Rem. to charities  0.56 0.97  0.40  1.27 0.96  1.28 
Chinese,  Rem. to persons  1.09 1.12  1.09  1.10 1.13  1.09 




Table C-1: Regression Equation Coefficients (OLS) Predicting the Expenditure Share of Remittances to 
Persons, 1992/1996 
  Canadian  N. Am. & W. Eu.  S&E European  Ch., Asian & Oc. 
 Uncontrolled  Controlled  Uncontrolled Controlled Uncontrolled Controlled Uncontrolled Controlled 
Log of Total Expenditures  0.003  0.033 0.015 0.064 0.001 0.054     
  [0.001]*  [0.002]*** [0.006]** [0.011]***  [0.008]  [0.015]***     
Log of Total Remittances              0.066  0.072 
         [0.012]***  [0.011]*** 
Log of Price for Food  0.172  0.175 0.450 0.232 -0.262  -0.140     
  [0.064]***  [0.060]***  [0.253]* [0.233] [0.477] [0.449]     
Log of Price for Shelter  0.056 0.020 0.102 0.080 0.024 0.051     
 [0.010]***  [0.010]**  [0.052]**  [0.048]*  [0.127]  [0.131]     
Log of Price for HH op&furn  -0.099 -0.243 0.090  0.062 0.888 0.338     
  [0.128]  [0.119]**  [0.491] [0.459] [1.261] [1.118]     
Log of Price for Clothing  0.084 0.012 0.335 0.167 0.617 0.291     
  [0.056] [0.052] [0.214] [0.210] [0.491] [0.470]     
Log of Price for Transportation  -0.037 -0.083 -0.033 -0.036 0.036 0.039     
  [0.009]***  [0.008]***  [0.042] [0.039] [0.070] [0.068]     
Log of Price for Health&Pers. Care  0.009 0.022 0.004 -0.020  -0.289 -0.236     
  [0.023] [0.021] [0.088] [0.085] [0.223] [0.198]     
Log of Price for Recreation  0.048  0.147 -0.094 -0.099 -0.749 -0.287     
  [0.092] [0.085]* [0.347] [0.327] [0.958] [0.844]     
Log of Price for Tabacco&Alcohol  -0.015 -0.028 -0.041 0.003 0.0413 -0.020     
  [0.017] [0.016]* [0.065] [0.061] [0.124] [0.120]     
Log of Price for Rem. to Persons  0.144 0.223 -0.057  -0.117 0.366 0.401 2.187 2.143 
 [0.131]  [0.121]*  [0.534]  [0.502]  [0.667] [0.667] [2.722] [2.631] 
Log of Price for Rem. to Charities  -0.300  -0.121 -0.201 0.077 -0.890 -0.832 -3.034 -2.864 
  [0.194] [0.181] [0.873] [0.791] [0.979] [0.950] [3.925] [3.793] 
Female   -0.004  -0.003  0.014  0.032 
    [0.001]***   [0.006]  [0.008]  [0.030] 
Age  x  100   -0.172  -0.119  -0.513  -0.075 
   [0.032]***   [0.146]   [0.205]**   [0.931] 
Age squared x 1,000    0.026  0.021  0.065  -0.029 
   [0.003]***   [0.015]   [0.022]***   [0.095] 
Education   -0.001  -0.006  -0.002  -0.036 
   [0.001]   [0.002]***   [0.003]   [0.011]*** 
Married (with HH member)    0.002  -0.003  0.023  -0.040 
   [0.002]  [0.008]   [0.010]**   [0.047] 
Separated/Divorced/Widowed   0.019  0.025  0.021  -0.088 
   [0.002]***  [0.009]***   [0.012]*    [0.057] 
No.  Of  Persons  a  Member   -0.012  -0.018  -0.018  -0.021 
   [0.001]***  [0.002]***  [0.004]***   [0.013] 
House Ownership    -0.001   0.003  -0.006  -0.076 
   [0.001]  [0.006]  [0.008]   [0.035]** 
Net change in A&L x 100,000    -0.019  0.001  0.021  -0.109 
    [0.009]**   [0.026]  [0.036]  [0.104] 
Constant  -0.262 -0.687 -2.584 -1.873 1.040  1.672 4.487 4.264 
 [0.409]  [0.386]*  [1.729]  [1.649]  [2.603] [2.838] [5.645] [5.479] 
Observations  13970  13970  1176  1176  632 632 540 540 
R-squared  0.01 0.14 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.17 0.07 0.13 
Robust standard errors in brackets               




Table C-2: Regression Equation Coefficients (OLS) Predicting the Expenditure Share of Remittances to 
Charities, 1992/1996 
  Canadian  N. Am. & W. Eu.  S&E European  Ch., Asian & Oc. 
 Uncontrolled  Controlled  Uncontrolled Controlled Uncontrolled Controlled Uncontrolled Controlled 
Log of Total Expenditures  -0.006  -0.001 -0.005 0.002 -0.007 0.004     
  [0.001]***  [0.001] [0.002]* [0.003] [0.003]**  [0.004]     
Log of Total Remittances              -0.066  -0.072 
         [0.012]***  [0.011]*** 
Log of Price for Food  0.142  0.121  -0.036 -0.050 -0.024 0.002     
  [0.032]***  [0.031]***  [0.160] [0.158] [0.195] [0.181]     
Log of Price for Shelter  0.050 0.041 0.006 0.007 0.040 0.023     
  [0.005]***  [0.004]***  [0.020] [0.019] [0.032] [0.038]     
Log of Price for HH op&furn  -0.274 -0.263 0.178  0.046 0.109 0.151     
  [0.059]***  [0.058]***  [0.242] [0.243] [0.385] [0.382]     
Log of Price for Clothing  -0.015 -0.025 0.208  0.097 0.225 0.244     
  [0.025]  [0.024] [0.104]** [0.105]  [0.167]  [0.186]     
Log of Price for Transportation  -0.041  -0.038 -0.026 -0.007 -0.018 -0.008     
  [0.004]***  [0.004]***  [0.015]* [0.016] [0.024] [0.026]     
Log of Price for Health&Pers. Care  0.055 0.050 0.028 0.042  -0.001 -0.001     
  [0.011]***  [0.010]***  [0.045] [0.043] [0.057] [0.056]     
Log of Price for Recreation  0.183  0.185 -0.120 -0.053 -0.275 -0.287     
  [0.042]***  [0.041]***  [0.176] [0.175] [0.289] [0.289]     
Log of Price for Tabacco&Alcohol  -0.023 -0.021 0.040  0.032 0.067 0.057     
  [0.008]***  [0.008]**  [0.045] [0.044] [0.049] [0.045]     
Log of Price for Rem. to Persons  -0.274  -0.102 0.609 0.604 -0.538 -0.412 -2.187 -2.143 
 [0.071]***  [0.067]  [0.308]**  [0.297]**  [0.386] [0.345] [2.722] [2.631] 
Log of Price for Rem. to Charities  0.376 0.147  -0.904  -0.895 0.710 0.554 3.034 2.864 
 [0.105]***  [0.100]  [0.461]*  [0.439]**  [0.560] [0.499] [3.926] [3.793] 
Female   0.001  0.004  0.004  -0.032 
   [0.001]  [0.003]  [0.004]  [0.030] 
Age  x  100   -0.074  -0.143  -0.205   0.075 
   [0.014]***    [0.073]*    [0.083]**    [0.931] 
Age squared x 1,000    0.014  0.021  0.029  0.029 
   [0.002]***  [0.008]***  [0.009]***   [0.095] 
Education   0.003    0.002  0.003  0.036 
   [0.001]***   [0.002]   [0.001]***  [0.011]*** 
Married (with HH member)    -0.004  -0.013  -0.005   0.040 
    [0.001]***   [0.010]  [0.010]  [0.047] 
Separated/Divorced/Widowed   -0.007  -0.016  -0.013   0.088 
    [0.001]***   [0.011]  [0.011]  [0.057] 
No. Of Persons a Member x 100    0.033    0.075    0.007    2.081 
   [0.025]  [0.120]  [0.010]  [1.302] 
House Ownership    0.003   0.011  -0.001  0.076 
   [0.001]***  [0.003]***   [0.004]    [0.035]** 
Net change in A&L x 100,000    0.013  -0.001  0.014  0.109 
    [0.003]***   [0.008]  [0.009]  [0.104] 
Constant -0.778  -0.425  0.132  0.830 -1.312 -1.477 -3.487 -3.264 
 [0.217]***  [0.206]**  [0.957]  [0.998] [1.114] [1.207] [5.645] [5.479] 
Observations  13970  13970  1176  1176  632 632 540 540 
R-squared 0.02  0.11  0.02  0.08 0.07 0.18 0.07 0.13 
Robust  standard  errors  in  brackets         
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%             
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